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267 pp. $28.00In the Preface of his book, Bray insists his 
work is not about single cells possess-
ing consciousness. “I say repeatedly in 
the book as clearly as English words will 
allow that in my opinion single cells are 
not sentient or aware in the same way 
that we are,” he writes (p. ix). The key 
part of this claim, however, is the clause 
“in the same way that we are.” Bray is not 
equating cellular and human cognition. 
However, he is up to something profound 
and perhaps slightly sneaky. Rather than 
place consciousness on a pedestal that 
only humans can reach, Bray seeks to 
define it along a continuum of systems 
and states. In this view, consciousness is 
not an absolute, and by some definition 
cells can indeed be said to be aware of 
themselves and of their surroundings.
To explore these ideas, the book 
swiftly covers most of the important 
work to-date in the nascent field known 
as systems biology. It provides an excel-
lent introduction to the field that is 
broadly accessible and would do well as 
required reading for graduate students 
in the biological sciences. Bray gives a 
colorful tour of diverse topics encom-
passing micro- and molecular biology, 
artificial intelligence, neuroscience, 
biochemistry, and robotics. In another 
context these subjects might have had 
less to do with one another—here, Bray 
convincingly shows how they are paral-
lel fields in search of a central theory of 
cognition. His skill is in framing the basics 
of molecular systems biology by way of 
deep and thought-provoking questions: 
What is the basis for consciousness? To 
what extent are machines and cells really 
intelligent?
Single cells can exhibit extraordinarily 
complex behaviors. To respond to their 
environment, single-celled organisms 
such as the amoeba adopt a complex 
set of internal cell states that Bray lik-
ens to feelings of hunger, curiosity, and 
fatigue (Chapter 1). He points out that 
these very complicated behaviors make 820 Cell 138, September 4, 2009 ©2009 Elseit difficult to argue that they are entirely 
hard wired—there is some dynamic 
learning even at the cellular level. To be 
capable of this, Bray proposes that the 
amoeba must possess an internal model 
of its environment and thus a primordial 
sense of self.
To understand these behaviors, Bray 
first turns to the field of artificial intelli-
gence. To Bray, the key finding of artifi-
cial intelligence (with regard to biology) is 
that surprisingly simple man-made rules 
can give rise to extraordinarily complex 
behaviors. He touches repeatedly on this 
concept by way of numerous examples—
citing artificial constructs such as the 
Game of Life, robotic vacuum cleaners, 
and even the 1980s video game Pac-
Man. Bray also alludes to a potential link 
between consciousness and the ability 
to replicate. Although living systems are 
machines, they are the only machines 
that routinely undergo self-repair and 
self-replication. That replication is linked 
to awareness is an intriguing notion, and vier Inc.it echoes previous suggestions by John 
von Neumann, Daniel Dennett, and oth-
ers. In fact, rudimentary self-replicating 
robots have now been constructed 
(Zykov et al., 2005, Nature 435, 163–164). 
It would be interesting to know how Bray 
incorporates such creatures into his 
worldview.
In the chapters on protein switches and 
signals, Bray seeks to understand and 
describe the molecular mechanisms that 
bestow cells with computational ability. 
To begin, he gives an excellent and eye-
opening account of thermal diffusion as 
the basis for all of life. Although biologists 
often visualize cellular processes as wir-
ing diagrams, linking together collections 
of genes, RNAs, proteins, or small mole-
cules, Bray points out that these “wires” 
are really nothing of the kind. They are 
diffusing molecules, more akin to cell 
phone transmission towers than point-
to-point wires. Later, Bray revisits ther-
mal diffusion to point out not only that it 
establishes connections in the cell, but 
also that these connections can be noisy 
resulting in biological individualism (cel-
lular free will, one wonders?).
A second key mechanism of cellular 
computation, according to Bray, is allos-
tery. Allosteric proteins are switches, in 
which the protein’s activity can be turned 
on or off through modification at an inde-
pendent site. Such proteins, Bray argues, 
serve precisely the same function in 
cells as do neurons in brains or transis-
tors in electronic circuits. He discusses 
many ways in which allosteric switch-like 
behavior can appear in biological sys-
tems, including enzymatic reactions and 
kinase-phosphatase signaling. Given 
many individual switches, Bray points 
out, it is very easy to store a near infinite 
number of cell states. He also makes the 
intriguing suggestion that protein com-
plexes may serve as rudimentary mem-
ory devices whose states persist much 
longer than the lifetime of a single cell. 
Although the individual proteins within a 
complex must turn over, the complex as 
a whole can persist in the same active 
state for much longer periods.
Yet another principle of cellular com-
putation might best be described as 
“co-activity between two connected 
switches.” According to the theory of 
learning known as synaptic plasticity, a 
synapse is more likely to be reinforced if 
both the axonal and dendritic sides of the 
synapse are excited synchronously or in 
rapid succession. Bray hypothesizes 
that this may be the crucial concept at 
work in ligand-receptor interactions—a 
provocative idea.
Chapter 6 is perhaps the most impor-
tant of the book. In it, Bray moves from 
individual switches to consider how 
many switches together behave as a type 
of neural network. If the neural network 
analogy is accurate, it has some impor-
tant predictions for biological systems. 
One of them is combinatorics—each 
gene will be controlled by a potentially 
very large and complex set of signals 
coming from other genes. Another one 
is redundancy: A neural network, and 
by analogy a gene network, should be 
robust enough to withstand removal of 
individual components. In support of 
the redundancy argument, Bray cites 
the finding that most genes do not pro-
duce any noticeable growth defect when 
removed from the genome. On the other 
hand, there is conflicting evidence in 
this regard. Guri Giaever and colleagues 
recently showed that, in fact, most genes 
are required for life. This requirement is 
not revealed by single gene knockouts 
in nutrient-rich conditions—it is revealed 
only in the particular stress conditions 
for which each gene is evolved to handle 
(Hillenmeyer et al., 2008, Science 320, 
362–365).
Regardless, Bray’s greater message is 
right on target. There is a type of neural 
network in every cell, involving connec-
tions at multiple levels including protein 
signaling, transcription, translation, and 
metabolism. Classical biology thinks in 
terms of sequential pathways of pro-
teins and metabolites, but the reality is 
an interconnected “hairball.” To see evi-dence of this, one needs only to read 
about the networks of protein-protein, 
transcriptional, and genetic interactions 
that are now being systematically eluci-
dated by numerous technologies. Pro-
teins such as kinases and transcription 
factors form myriad connections with 
other molecules, over a wide spectrum 
of connection strengths (or in neural net-
work terminology, “weights”). In any par-
ticular cell type or organism we observe 
one particular set of weights, but many 
different patterns of weightings are pos-
sible to produce the same function and 
no particular pattern is sacred.
Recent studies suggest that some 
metabolic networks and protein com-
plexes may remain stable over evolution-
ary time, whereas informational networks 
involved in signaling and regulation may 
be dramatically reprogrammed, even 
over short evolutionary distances (Tuch 
et al., 2008, Science 319, 1797–1799). 
Such gross changes are consistent with 
the neural network model, in which the 
same function can be encoded by many 
alternative patterns of connections and 
weights “under the hood.” Given this 
property, it seems likely that cells can 
tolerate much more evolutionary drift 
in their gene and protein networks than 
has been previously appreciated. Such 
implications are profound and have not 
yet been adequately grasped by the bio-
medical community. We should not be so 
focused on mapping what proteins are 
wired to what other proteins. The real-
ity may in fact be much more daunting: 
everything is connected to everything. It 
is the weights that matter.
One area of research that seems rel-
evant to Bray’s argument, but that was 
missing from it, is the field of biological 
computing. In work pioneered by Leon-Cell 138, Sard Adleman, DNA and proteins are used 
explicitly as a highly parallel, man-made 
computer to solve computationally hard 
problems. Nowhere else has “the cell as 
computer” analogy been so direct and 
accurate. It also would have been nice 
to have had greater attention paid to the 
ongoing systematic efforts to decipher 
the cell’s gene and protein networks. 
Investigators in the ‘omics sciences 
(genomics, proteomics, metabolomics, 
etc.) are working hard to decipher the 
patterns of molecular wiring and weights 
that Bray describes. It seems that Chap-
ter 10 (Genetic Circuits) might be a natu-
ral place to include these topics. Finally, 
Bray’s philosophical discussion of what 
it would take to construct a minimal cell 
would be bolstered by mention of recent 
work by several groups to engineer 
exactly such a cell based on genomes 
that are naturally small, such as that of 
Mycoplasma.
Ultimately, questions about cellular 
cognition are as much philosophy as biol-
ogy. In this regard, Bray’s view seems 
particularly well aligned with that of David 
Chalmers, who in his 1996 book The Con-
scious Mind: In Search of a Fundamen-
tal Theory credits all information-bearing 
systems with some level of conscious-
ness but not necessarily with cognition 
or awareness. Reading Bray’s musings 
at the intersection of philosophy and biol-
ogy, one also wonders whether there is 
room for a field of “existential biology.” In 
existentialism, it is individuals who invent 
their own values and create the very terms 
under which they excel. What a perfect 
system of thought in which to encompass 
not only people as individuals but also 
artificially intelligent computer programs 
and nonhuman life forms including—if we 
can stomach it—single cells…
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